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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Should this Court consider Mr. Sursa's appeal of the 
dismissal of his petition to terminate alimony when Mr. Sursa 
uses the wrong standard of review? 
2. Should this Court consider Mr. Sursa's appeal of the 
dismissal when Mr. Sursa fails to marshal the evidence that 
supports the trial court's findings and order? 
3. Did Mr. Sursa meet his burden to prove cohabitation 
when the facts showed a dating relationship with only a brief 
sexual relationship at the dating relationship's inception? 
4. Should Ms. Sursa be awarded the fees and costs she 
incurred on appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellant, Mr. Sursa, must marshal the evidence and 
show that the court's ruling was clearly erroneous based on 
that evidence. x'[T]he clearly erroneous standard [applies] to 
. . . findings supporting a dismissal because the trial court 
was not persuaded by the evidence." Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah 
1 
Copper Corp. , 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A 
finding of cohabitation, or by implication a finding of the 
lack of cohabitation, is "not reverse [d] . . . unless the 
appellant . . . shows the finding to be clearly erroneous." 
Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code § 30-3-5(10): 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the 
party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) : 
A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings: 
The parties were divorced on July 25, 2001, after a 
thirty year marriage. Addendum No. 1. The decree awarded the 
Respondent/Appellee (herein referred to as "Ms. Sursa") the 
home, monies and personal property. The Petitioner/Appellant 
(herein referred to as "Mr. Sursa") was awarded the family 
business, vehicles and property. Ms. Sursa was awarded 
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alimony of $3,100.00 per month. Ms. Sursa had married at age 
16, had not worked outside the home during the marriage and 
had health problems. On June 10, 2002, Mr. Sursa filed a 
petition to modify claiming that the business had financial 
reversals and that Ms. Sursa was cohabiting. After discovery 
showed no financial reversal, Mr. Sursa dismissed that part of 
his petition and the case proceeded to trial on the 
cohabitation issue. Trial was on September 22, 2003. At the 
end of Mr. Sursa's case, the trial court dismissed the 
petition finding that the evidence showed a dating 
relationship, but did not show cohabitation. The court also 
awarded Ms. Sursa the fees and costs she had incurred. This 
appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts: 
Ms. Sursa, who lives in her home in Cedar View (an area 
northwest of Roosevelt City), R. 525:37:18-19, and Dane 
Gerkin, who lives in Roosevelt City, R. 525:58:13-16, began 
dating a few weeks after Ms. Sursa's divorce was finalized on 
July 26, 2001. R. 525:114:7-16. At the beginning of the 
relationship, August and September of 2001, Ms. Sursa stayed 
"most of the night" at Mr. Gerkin's house on "[a] few 
occasions," R. 525:116:1-117:5, and, on those occasions, 
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"sometimes" engaged in sexual activity. R. 525:145:2-146:7. 
The sexual contact ended in September 2001. R. 525:146. After 
that date the only time Ms. Sursa spent nights at Mr. Gerkin' s 
residence was when she was ill, R. 525:117:4-5, and "ha[d] no 
one else to take care of her." R. 525:150:12-13. After 
September 2001, the physical contact between Ms. Sursa and Mr. 
Gerkin on overnight stays was limited to "[slitting beside 
[each other] on the couch." R. 525:146:12. 
The majority of testimony relied on by Mr. Sursa was that 
Ms. Sursa's vehicle was parked at Mr. Gerkin's residence. The 
evidence, ignored by Mr. Sursa, was that Mr. Gerkin did not 
own a vehicle and during much of the time in question Ms. 
Sursa lacked a driver's license. R. 525:150:15-16; 525:151:19-
22. Ms. Sursa, therefore, allowed Mr. Gerkin to use her truck 
to run errands and "a few times" for his own purposes. R. 
525:152:6-9; 525:144:12-25; 525:23:16-22; 525:42:7-10; 
525:152:6-9. Ms. Sursa was the only person who made payments 
on the truck. R. 525:144:18-21. The truck was at times left 
at Mr. Gerkin's residence. R. at 525:84:21-85:6. Witnesses 
called by Mr. Sursa conceded that Ms. Sursa's vehicle's 
presence at Mr. Gerkin's residence was not necessarily 
evidence that Ms. Sursa was present. An investigator 
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retained by Mr. Sursa testified that he knocked on the door 
and no one was home. R. 525:84. Ms. Sursa' s daughter 
testified she transported Ms. Sursa from Mr. Gerkin's home 
without taking the truck. R. 525:119:11-18. Ms. Sursa 
testified she left the truck at Mr. Gerkin's because she did 
not have a driver's license and therefore he used the truck to 
assist her. R. 525:122. 
On an unspecified number of occasions, while Ms. Sursa 
was visiting Mr. Gerkin, he prepared and shared food that he 
had purchased. R. 525:120:9-15. They also dined out together 
"once or twice every two weeks" for an undefined period. R. 
525:120:18-20. "[Mr. Gerkin] paid most of the time," while 
Ms. Sursa paid sometimes when she had family members with 
them. R. 525:120:23-25. 
Ms. Sursa and Mr. Gerkin did not share utility expenses or 
any other expenses. Ms. Sursa maintained her residence in 
Cedar View and Mr. Gerkin maintained his residence in 
Roosevelt. Ms. Sursa did pay Mr. Gerkin for pictures he 
sketched for her. R. 525:135:21-138:21. And, on one 
occasion, Ms. Sursa paid the purchase price for one of the 
artworks by paying on a utility bill to keep Mr. Gerkin's 
power on, rather than paying Mr. Gerkin. R.525:131:17-132 :1. 
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Throughout their friendship, Mr. Gerkin never had a key 
to Ms. Sursa' s home, and she did not have one to his. R. 
525:151:4-11. The only personal items of Ms. Sursa that a 
witness saw on one occasion at Mr. Gerkin's house were Ms. 
Sursa's purse, cigarettes, keys, blanket, shoes and an outfit 
of clothing, part of which Ms. Sursa was wearing and the rest 
of which was near her as she lay ill on the floor. R. 
525:22:17-23:13/ 525:41:6-12. In contrast, the same witness 
observed furniture and toiletries in place at Ms. Sursa's home 
in Cedar View. R. 525:42:16-43:7. Neither Mr. Gerkin nor Ms. 
Sursa remained at the home of the other while the other was 
away. R. 525:151:4-11. 
Following the divorce, and during their friendship, Ms. 
Sursa also dated others. A witness observed Ms. Sursa 
"socializing . . . with other people," and saw her in the 
company of a man other than Mr. Gerkin at her Cedar View home. 
R. 525:65:8-22. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court, based on the evidence adduced at 
trial, dismissed this case on the merits. Thus, the clearly 
erroneous standard applies to the findings made by the trial 
court, including the court's finding that there was no 
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cohabitation. 
2. A party challenging findings undertakes the weighty 
responsibility of marshaling the evidence supporting the 
findings, and then illuminating an incurable defect derived 
from the evidence. In this matter, Mr. Sursa did compile some 
of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, but 
ignored other evidence, and, he did not present evidence that 
unalterably undermined the findings. Thus, the Court should 
sustain the trial court's findings. 
3. Mr. Sursa did not establish cohabitation, which is 
his burden under the statute. Mr. Sursa presented evidence 
that Ms. Sursa spent time with Mr. Gerkin, but did not 
establish residency nor show an ongoing sexual relationship. 
The evidence at most showed a dating relationship. The 
statute is clear that a party seeking to terminate alimony 
bears the burden of proving cohabitation. As that party, Mr. 
Sursa must establish both elements of cohabitation. 
4. Ms. Sursa is entitled to be awarded the fees and 
costs she incurs on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. SURSA USES THE WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW BY 
MISTAKENLY COUCHING THIS CASE AS ONE DISMISSED ON 
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PRIMA FACIE GROUNDS RATHER THAN AS ONE DISMISSED ON 
THE MERITS. 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure involves 
two types of dismissal, each with its own standard of review. 
Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 1144. The trial court may afford 
dismissal either "when the plaintiff has failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case cxr when 
the trial court is not persuaded by the evidence introduced." 
Id. (emphasis added). In cases of the first kind, this Court 
"review[s] for correctness." Icl. In contrast, "[i]f the 
court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, 
the court . . . make[s] findings as provided in Rule 52(a)," 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), and this Court "appl[ies] the clearly 
erroneous standard to the findings supporting a dismissal that 
was granted because the trial court was not persuaded by the 
evidence." Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 1144. 
In this case, the trial court received Mr. Sursa's 
evidence, but was not convinced by it. Indeed, the court 
stated its findings, that "this case cr[ied] out for a finding 
of failure to show cohabitation," R. 525:161:2-3, and entered 
findings to that effect. R. 441 5 3. Consequently, this Court 
"view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
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court's determination." Gillmor v. Cumminqs, 904 P.2d 703, 706 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Mr. Sursa's assertion that he "made a prima facie case of 
cohabitation and therefore, granting the Motion to Dismiss was 
error," is without merit and misses the standard of review. 
Appellant's Br. at 21. "[T]he trial court may grant a Rule 
41(b) motion even if the plaintiff has made out a prima facie 
case." Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 1144. Once it does, and "make[s] 
findings," Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), those "[f]indings . . . 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52 (a) . 
Among the findings Mr. Sursa must demonstrate to be 
clearly erroneous are the findings related to the lack of 
cohabitation in this case. In Barber, this Court confirmed a 
trial court decision that terminated alimony due to the lower 
court's "finding that [she] was cohabiting." 792 P.2d at 134. 
This Court said: 
Anita's attack on the termination of alimony is 
simply an attack on the finding of cohabitation. 
However, in that attack, she wholly fails to take 
into account our standard of review. We do not 
reverse a trial court's finding of fact unless the 
appellant . . . shows the finding to be clearly 
erroneous. 
9 
Id. See also Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
POINT II 
MR. SURSA FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding." The party must "then demonstrate that the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding even in viewing 
it in the light most favorable to the court below." Alta 
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989)). 
If "the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, [the 
Court] refuse[s] to consider the merits of challenges to the 
findings and accept [s] the findings as valid." Oneida/SLIC v. 
Oneida Cold Storage, 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Mountain States Broadcasting Co. V. Neale, 783 P.2d 
551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Meeting the marshaling 
mandate requires more than including "some evidence that 
supports the . . . findings." West v. Keil, 48 P.3d 888, 893 
(Utah 2002). 
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This Court expanded upon these basic precepts in West 
Vallev City v. Majestic Investment Co. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(1991), explaining: 
[t]he marshaling process is not unlike becoming the 
devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or 
herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. 
Id. 
Mr. Sursa falls short of meeting the marshaling threshold 
by overlooking evidence, including Ms. Sursa's statements, 
that are contrary to his position. The following is part of 
the evidence from the trial that supports the trial court's 
findings that were ignored by Mr. Sursa showing he did not 
marshal the evidence as required. 
Mr. Sursa's relies on a claim by Sammi Fillingim that she 
believed her mother lived with Dane Gerkin. Appellant's Br. at 
14. He fails to note that Ms. Fillingim had three versions to 
the claim that Ms. Sursa lived with Mr. Gerkin. The letter 
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she wrote, denoted Exhibit 1, her deposition testimony and her 
trial testimony. R. 525:39-48. Mr. Sursa neglects to mention 
other testimony offered by Ms. Fillingim that favored the 
trial court's findings. For example, Ms. Fillingim testified 
that she had been to the Cedar View home, following her 
parents' breakup, and seen furniture and toiletries in the 
house, R. 525:42:16-43:7, bolstering the proposition that Ms. 
Sursa was living in the home. Ms. Fillingim also testified 
that she transported Ms. Sursa from Mr. Gerkin's house, and 
that Ms. Sursa's truck remained behind, R. 525:44:20-45:3, 
demonstrating that the presence of the truck did not indicate 
the presence of Ms. Sursa at the residence. Perhaps most 
importantly, Ms. Fillingim testimony exposed her biases and 
inconsistencies. Mr. Sursa did not mention that, at the time 
of trial, Ms. Fillingim had no relationship with her mother, 
R. 525:35:21-24, that Ms. Fillingim conceded, at her 
deposition, that she harbored feelings of bitterness for Ms. 
Sursa, R. 525:39:13-17, that Ms. Fillingim admitted that one 
reason for her hostility was that she believed Mr. Sursa was 
treated unfairly when her parents divorced, R. 525:39:20-25, 
that Ms. Fillingim did not think her father should pay "as 
much" alimony, R. 525:40:1-3, and that Ms. Fillingim authored 
12 
a letter, prior to the trial, that conflicted with her 
statements before the court, R. 525:48:1-3, Exhibit 1. 
Chad Richard, a longtime friend of Mr. Sursa, R. 
525:57:7, also contributed information supportive of Ms. 
Sursa's position which was omitted from Mr. Sursa's brief. 
Mr. Richard testified that he noticed Ms. Sursa's mother 
driving Ms. Sursa's truck, R. 525:63:20-21, that he observed 
a man other than Mr. Gerkin at Ms. Sursa's house one evening, 
when he, Mr. Richard, visited her home following her divorce, 
R. 525:65:8-13, and that he drove by the Cedar View home 
"occasionally," and had seen Ms. Sursa's truck there. R. 
525:66:12-15. 
Chris Port, the investigator retained by Mr. Sursa, 
offered testimony, not included in the Mr. Sursa's brief, that 
buttresses the court's findings, as well. Mr. Sursa states 
that "a private investigator never saw anyone or Karen's truck 
at the house in Cedar View." Appellant's Br. at 14. He, 
however, ignores the admission by Mr. Port that the truck 
could have been in the garage without his knowing it, R. 
525:83, and that there were numerous days when the vehicle was 
not at the Gerkin residence. R. 525:84. Mr. Sursa also 
excludes evidence, derived from Mr. Port's testimony, that, 
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during his two months of observations, he saw Mr. Gerkin and 
Ms. Sursa together at Mr. Gerkin's house only twice, R. 
525:78:20-79:79:2, that, with the exception of these few 
times, all Mr. Port saw was the truck and that he did not know 
who was in the house, R. 525:83:2-6, that he did not know when 
the truck arrived at or departed from Mr. Gerkin's house, R. 
525:84:21-23, that Mr. Port knocked at Mr. Gerkin's house 
while the truck was there and no one was home (again 
indicating the presence of the truck did not equate with the 
presence of people), R. 525:84:24-85:1, and that he did not 
observe the house for a number of the days during the two-
month period. R. 525:83:25-85:9. 
Patsy Sursa, Mr. Sursa's new wife, like Mr. Port, 
testified that she often saw the truck at Mr. Gerkin's house. 
Appellant's Br. at 15. However, Mr. Sursa does not mention 
that between May, 2002, and March, 2003, R. 525:93:24-94:2, 
though Pasty Sursa drove by multiple times per day, R. 
525:94:3-4, she saw Ms. Sursa (Karen) at Mr. Gerkin's house 
only once. R. 525:97:8-11. 
Mr. Sursa relies on his brother, Ronnie Sursa, to argue 
that Mr. Gerkin was at the Cedar View home when Ms. Sursa was 
away. Appellant's Br. at 16, 19. He fails to tell the Court 
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that this testimony was stricken by the court because it was 
not reliable. R. 525:105:8-9. 
Portions of Ms. Sursa's own testimony were also 
overlooked by Mr. Sursa in his brief. In terms of the 
residency element of cohabitation, Mr. Sursa omits Ms. Sursa's 
direct response that she never lived at Mr. Gerkins' home. R. 
at 525:151:2-3. Mr. Sursa further makes inaccurate claims 
supporting his position or fails to couple claims with 
contradictory evidence. For instance, Mr. Sursa asserts that 
"[Ms. Sursa] purchased groceries because [Mr. Gerkin] cooked 
for her at his home," Appellant's Br. at 15, but ignores Ms. 
Sursa's testimony that it was Mr. Gerkin who paid for food she 
consumed when she ate at his house. R. 525:120:8-13. Mr. 
Sursa asserts that Mr. Gerkin took Ms. Sursa's vehicle 
"whenever he wanted." Appellants' Br. at 16. As support, he 
cites the "testimony" not of any of the witnesses, but a 
statement of Mr. Sursa's attorney at the trial court. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Sursa leaves out Ms. Sursa's direct testimony 
to the contrary. R. 525:152:6. 
There are also omissions in Mr. Sursa's brief concerning 
Ms. Sursa's testimony about her relationship with Mr. Gerkin. 
Ms. Sursa outlined the time line for her sexual contact with 
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Mr. Gerkin. Ms. Sursa's testimony establishes that she had 
very limited sexual contact with Mr. Gerkin during August and 
September in 2001 and none thereafter, which testimony was 
never refuted. After those first two months, Ms. Sursa 
explained that she stayed some nights at Mr. Gerkin' s house 
only because she was ill and the doctor had recommended that 
she not be alone, R. at 525:117:4-5, something she reaffirmed 
in later testimony. R. at 525:147:2-10. 
Mr. Sursa overlooked, in his brief, testimony from every 
witness, which supports the trial court's decision. As a 
result, the Court should "refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." 
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1503 (quoting Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co., 783 P.2d at 553. 
Even if Mr. Sursa had adequately assembled "every scrap 
of competent evidence," West Valley City, 818 P. 2d at 1315, 
which he did not do, he needed to do more than highlight 
disputes. He had to reveal a "fatal flaw in the evidence." 
Id. Mr. Sursa did not show any flaw to the findings, let 
alone a fatal flaw. Thus, the findings should stand 
regardless of the success or failure of his marshaling 
attempt. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT ALIMONY 
PAYMENTS TO MS. SURSA SHOULD NOT TERMINATE, BECAUSE 
SHE DID NOT COHABIT. 
Even if this court reviews the trial court's 
determination for correctness, Mr. Sursa has not established 
that Ms. Sursa cohabited with Mr. Gerkin. Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-5(10) dictates that w[a]ny order of the court that a party 
pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment 
by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person."1 "Cohabitation is 
comprised of . . . two elements: (1) common residency and (2) 
sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." Pendleton 
v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 161 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
A. MS. SURSA DID NOT SHARE A COMMON RESIDENCE WITH 
MR. GERKIN. 
"Cohabitation," the Urah Supreme Court explained, "is not 
a sojourn, nor a habit of visiting, nor even remaining with 
for a time; the term implies continuity•" Haddow v. Haddow, 
707 P.2d 669, 673 (Utah 1935) (guoting Burke v. Burke, 340 P.2d 
lMr. Sursa argues thar Ms. Sursa has the burden on the 
sexual contact element. He fails to inform the court that 
the cases that he relies on were based on a former version 
of the statute that provided for that split in the burden. 
The present statute now clearly puts that burden on Mr. 
Sursa. 
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948, 950 (Or. 1959)), Indeed, illustrating the threshold 
requirement of continuity, the court wrote that cohabiting is 
akin "to liv[ing] together as husband and wife." id. at 671 
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 236 (5th ed. 1979)). The 
court additionally stated that "common residency means the 
sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their 
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period 
of time." Id. at 672. 
In Pendleton, this Court, applying these principles, 
determined that a couple, Bill and Joyce, did cohabit. 918 
P.2d at 161. The "largely undisputed facts" included "[Bill's] 
stayfing] with Joyce ninety percent of the time when he was in 
town," "Bill[As] . . . [possessing] his own key to Joyce's 
home," Bill's having "free access to the home," Bill's 
"spen[ding] time there when Joyce was away," "Joyce['s] and 
Billys] [eating] almost all meals together when Bill was in 
town," and "Bill['s] ke[eping] clothing and other personal 
effects at Joyce's home." Ld. In short, Bill lived at 
Joyce's home. "He came and went . . . ihree or four times 
daily, even when she was not there." Id. Those facts do not 
exist in this case, nor does anything remotely similar. 
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In Siqq, 905 P.2d at 918, this Court upheld a trial court 
finding of cohabitation when the parties had a sexual 
relationship, shared living expenses, had open access to each 
other's condominiums, ate together and shared food expenses, 
kept clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture 
and 'otherwise lived as though they were husband and wife.'" 
Id. 
In Pendleton and Sigg the court fairly found that the 
respective couples "lived as though they were husband and 
wife." Sigg, 905 P.2d at 918. The facts relating to Ms. Sursa 
and Mr. Gerkin, however, deviate dramatically from the facts 
supporting cohabitation in the cited cases. Ms. Sursa and Mr. 
Gerkin truly lived apart. There is no evidence that either 
kept furniture or clothing at the other's home other than the 
clothing Ms. Sursa had on the occasion she was recuperating 
from an illness at Mr. Gerkin' s home. She was not even 
occupying one of his beds but was lying on the floor. 
Moreover, the presence of one personal item, the blanket, that 
Ms. Sursa had with her at Mr. Gerkin's home seems unremarkable 
in light of Ms. Sursa's sickness. R. 525:41:6-7. 
Although Ms. Sursa occasionally ate at Mr. Gerkin's 
house, and she and Mr. Gerkin ate out one or two times during 
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a two wee k t j me p e r i o d, f o r a i 1 i 11 1 s p e c i f :i e d t e i 11 11 e, t1 11 s do e s 
not indicate that they "ate almost all meals together." 
Pendleton,9 \ : * 
Ms. Sursa and Mr. Gerkin's overnight visits were rare, 
arid spanne :i a er s br ief per iod of 11 Ieir f r iendship . Ms. 
Sursa describes the number of times she stayed with Mr. Gerkin 
ea: . ^  i i I t \ i e r elationship a s x |>U I * • w occasions." R. 
525 :116: 4-5 . She also testified that "on the occasions [she] 
spent several nights, [she had] been sick." R. 525:117:4-5. 
Therefore, although the actual ni imber : • f ti mes stayed at Mr. 
Gerkin's was not mentioned at trial, the evidence supports Ms. 
Sursa' s tf-.qt"^ v "li'it t^ r- ovnrni jM 'i M • w-rt; sporadic and 
after the first two months were due to illness and a need to 
have another adi :i ] t present. 11 i additioi I, Mr Gerkir/ s 
overnight stays at Ms. Sursa's home were likewise "few," and 
wi t huut sexual co r I t act, I ! 525:14 6:2-5. M r. Sursa's counsel 
posited that there were 15 such stays between October, 2002 
and April, 2uUJ, r 5^5:14 5-147. Ms. Sursa did not confirm. 
this figure, 1 1. 525:145:25-146:2, but, e ^  r e n i s s h e h a :I, :i t :i s 
an average of roughly two stays per month, half the mean found 
insufficient to establish residency in Haddow, 70 ~> P. 2d at 
671. 
2 0 
Perhaps most Importai 11 ] \ , I :!:i : Gerk i i 1 an :I 1 1 s S1 ,3 rsa 1 acked 
the right to enter the other's abode at wil] Neither had a 
key to the home of 11 1 e other, an• :i 1 1 s Si 3 3 :sa testifi ed that s 1: 1 e 
never remained at Mr. Gerkin's house when he was away. R. 
525 1 1 51 1 4 1 1 I vddi tio 1 1 a 1 ] y , 1 io o 1 1 e else tesuified that either 
Mr. Gerkin or Ms. Sursa tarried unaccompanied at the residence 
: 1 111-' ,jt:he 1: T1 1 e i 1 1 stant case passes the two-prong test 
(lack of a k»>y ai id absence of free access) for lack of 
residency set forth in Haddow. 707 P.2d a: 673. 
The fact that the evidence here d.c es not even meet the 
test stated in Haddow is significant because the Haddow case, 
where the Court d e t e r m i n e d t h ere w a s 1 1 :: :: o h a b i t a t i c • n, 1 1 a s 1 E i u c h 
stronger evidence that could conceivably support a finding of 
cohabit at i .~>n flnn > his case,, Th • 111 I ^nstiucled; 
The time petitioner's boyfriend spent in the 
dwelling was extensive, easily sufficient to qualify 
as residence if time alone controlled. But the time 
was not spent as a resident. He maintained a 
separate residence and shared none cf the expenses 
of this one. He did not even have a key or freedom 
to enter it except when petitioner was present. In 
simple terms he did not live there. 
Id. at 674 (quoting In re Marriage of Gibson, 320 N.W.2d 822, 
82 4 (Iowa 19 8 2)), The evIde 1 1 ce presented :o the trial court 
in this case does not establish an amount of time spent at Mr. 
Gerkin' s 1: lome, and does not illustrate that Ms. Sursa was 
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anything other than a :i s:i t• D r a t I ii : Gerki i 1' s 1 1 : • me The 
evidence certainly does not support a finding of residency but 
rather s u p p o r t s t h e :: : • 1 i r t' s f i i 1 :1 i i i • g 1 1 1 a t i t w a s a d a f i i 1 g 
relationship and that there v/as not cohabitation. 
B. MS. SURSA'S ABBREVIATED SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT 
WITH MR. GERKIN DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING 
OF COHABITATION. 
Haddow established not only the element of common 
residency but also set the standard for the second prong of 
cohabitation-asexual contact evidencing a conjugal 
association. '• Haddow, 7 0' 7 P 2 d a t 6 7 2 " S e x u a J c o n t a c t, ' 
explained the court, "means participation in a relatively 
permanent sexua1 re1ationship akii I to 11 iat gei iera11y existing 
between husband and wife.'7 Id. 
Likewise, I In,.! court, in Garcia v. Garcia, a case in 
which a party admitted sexual contact over a period of roughly 
eighteen months, found the threshold for the second prong met. 
60 P.3d 1174, 1 1 7 4 - H 7 5 (2002). In Siqc \, — - peri:?i of Ms. 
Sigg's sexual involvement with her live-in boyfriend began in 
February of 1993 and cont i ni ied beyon :I 11 Ie ini tia11on c f M:i :. 
Sigg's action in November of that year. 905 P. 2d at 911. 
Again, this i" - .: . :.:.";:: ; x._;; ^ ;.. Ld. at 
918. The duration of the contact was somewhat shorter n I 
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Pendleton, w 1 i e r e it be g a n o n 1 y a f e \ / n L O n t h s p J : i : • J : t : • it: I: 1 = • 
exhusband's entreaties to the court to end alimony, 918 P.2d 
at 160. 'This f"-mu I ••^mmpnt^ 11 | , ^ W P V P I , I I, i f i I ' ' „ .-1 i II 
going on as of the time of trial," id., and made specific 
refere n c e 1: : • " :»r I g o i n g s e x u a 1 c o i I t a c 1:"" :i i :i :i t s 1 i o 1 ::1 :i i i • :j. id . a t 
161. Though there are differences among these cases, one 
commonality that unites tin m i , lh,il the sexual relationships 
were relatively long-term, consistent and persisted until the 
time : f tr ial. See Haddow, 'n i , 2d at 6 .'2; Garcia, 60 P. 3d at 
1174; Siqq, 905 P.2d at 917; Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160. 
The instant case stands in contrast to the above 
authorities. Ms. Sursa and Mr. Gerki'n W ^ T P sexuaJ 1; uivoived 
for only a two-month time period. R. 525:145:2-14 6:7; 
52 5: ] ] 6 : ] ] ] 7 :  5 ; 5 2 5 : '1 4 9 : 2 3 2 5 ; 5 Tl: ;  gi I i c k 1 y 
decided, however , to abandon that course, although they 
remained friends • I 525 i 1 15:2 ] 3; 525:116:1 - 13. On the 
whole, their relationship cannot fairly be characterized as "a 
relatively permaner it sexual relationship akin to that 
generally existing between husband and wife," as mandated by 
Haddow. 7 0 ; . • Ms. Sursa and Mr. Gerkin 
discontinued sexual relations months before the petition was 
filed. The facts fully support the court's finding "they had 
2 3 
a sexual relationship at first ' I • i> " I, 3 i I 
duration and did not create a case of cohabitation. R. 
525:159:19-20 
C w ~ SURSA AND MR. GERKIN DID NOT SHARE EXPENSES. 
.. -; t : • • :i I s t i 11 the essence of 
cohabitation in Haddow, it stated "that in some jurisdictions 
elemenl |'<L cohabitation], shared living expenses, is 
either an essential ingredient of cohabitation, or evi dence • : f 
., i 1 ' 70 7 P.2 :i at 6 73 (citations omitted) . The Uuah court 
favored the second approach. JEd. at 673 674, T) ,, i i nt -ih, 
"the sharing of living expenses m,r; be indicative 
of maintaininq a shared household an I I - regarded as b^iue 
evidence of residency.'7 Pendleton, 918 P. 2d at 160. This 
Court propounded the rational •=:, e.\piessing that "while it is 
not important if , . , two share assets in a general sense, it 
may indeed be r elevar it if one party pays the other's mortgage, 
the insurance on his or her house, or the u t i 1 i t y 
bills-actions which would be quite atypical for a mere 
visitor." :_±. at 160-161. 
In this case there was no sharing of living expenses 
except occasionally sharing a nv>-il tngethei . Mh> n Mi . l^ikin 
and Ms. Sursa ate together at his house, he purchased the food 
2 4 
and she offered no reimbursement. R. S±^> . 120 :12-15 . When they 
ate out, "[h]e paid most of the time." R. 525:120:23-25. She 
covered the bill occasion a 1 ] ] " d e p e n d [ i n g ] : i I w 1: i D [ s :i :: ] [ s h e ] 
had with [her]." R. 525:24-25. In other words, when she 
p i c k e d i i p 11 i e t a b f : • r a ] a r g e r g r o u p w h :i :: h g e n era ] 1 y :i i I z 1 u d e d 
her family members, she also paid Mr. Gerkin's portion. 
These c i r c u m s t a n c e s d i v erge i ft a r k e d 1 y f r o rn v* 1: I a t s e e i r i s 1 I I e 
prototypical meal-sharing system, in wh:i ch, as in Pendleton, 
a pair "[eats] all t tost all meals together.1 Pendleton, 918 P. 2d 
at 161. Moreover, Ms. Sursa/s withholding of reimbursement 
evinces that she and I :Ir Gerkin did not share food expenses. 
Instead, as in the typical friendship or dating relaticnshinr 
Mr. Gerkin, as the owner of his home, supplied food to his 
guest without slipping h^r :m i Tvni m before sh^ stepped nr 
his door. Finally7, even in Haddow, where Mr. Hudson gave 
money t < • Mrs, n^ddow t i hii i .. |, "n I ,,'J :;i ^ '4, md /;hei^  
"Mr. Hudson had dinner at [Mrs. Haddow's] house five or six 
times a we e ] :, id , a t 6 ; ' 0 6 ; ] , 11 I e I J t a I I Supreme Court ruled 
that Mr. Hudson and Mrs. Haddow did not qualify as common 
residents. 
In addition to eating with Mr Gerkin, Ms. Sursa allowed 
Mr. Gerkin to drive her truck. R. 525:152:6-9. Mr. Gerkin 
owned no automobile. Thus, when Mr. Gerkin and Ms. Surs;i 
went somewhere together that required motorized 
transportation, they necessarily had M. i IM MS Si irsa/s 
pickup. On at least some of these outings, he did drive. R. 
525:152:6-7. At oth^i liiii-:., Mr M . r H n -Irn-,: i.JJ(. Li.u-1 c 
without M s . Sursa's company, as he utilized the truck to run 
errands for h^r wh-vi sti ,' i i I I I " " I >M ; Lz-Z' Mr. 
Gerkin, however, was not unique in taking the truck to assist 
I' 1 s S u r s a - o t h e r i i 1 :I i \ i d u a Is helping her also used the vehicle. 
R. 525:150:23-151:1. Significantly, for a period, Ms. Sursa 
lacked a d ri ver's license, 525:150:15-16; 525:151:19-22. 
Thus, she was dependent upon on others to drive her, ai i< :i, 
because Ms. Sursa obviously was not supposed to drive, and Mr. 
Gerkin had no car of his own to travel between hi s home ai id 
her residence outside of Roosevelt, it made sense to keep the 
truck at Mr. Gerki r Mr s 1 101 :i se some of the t,i me, tl lougl I Ms . Sursa 
remained at her home in Cedar View. In short, Ms. Sursa and 
M r G e r k i n d i d n o t s h a r e a i i a u t onto b 11 e . The v ehicle was Ms. 
Sursa's. She allowed others to use it as they acted on her 
b e h a .1 f, a i i. d, a s a 2 ourtesy, she imparted minimal driving 
privileges to Mr. Gerkin, who had no vehicle. 
» i 
, : t) 
Not only was M s . Sursa considerate enough to lend 1 lei 
vehicle to Mr. Gerkin when he departed to run her errands, 
but, unsurprising!y, she also gave him the f 1 inds he neede• :i t : • 
accomplish them. R. 525:14 4:16-21 Indeed, the checks she 
signed for h e r p r e s c r i p 11 o n s , g r o c e r i e s , e t c \ , :i 1 1 i e • s s 11: I a t 
she did not expect Mr. Gerkin to cover her costs of living. 
L i k. e t h e m o n e ;y :j :i "1!; r e i I 1: • \, I '! i: 1 11 id s o i I t : if "1 :i : s H a ddo w f o r I i i s d r y 
cleaning, these checks "were reimbursements and evidence an 
intent t : • I: = a i : [persoi Ia 1 ] expei Ises Haddow, ; 0 7 I 2d at 6 7" 4 . 
By giving Mr. Gerkin resources or repayment for her private 
acquisitions and obligations, Ms. Sursa manifested her intent 
not to draft him into sharing her expenses. 
Ms. Sursa paid some money to Mr. Gerkin to acquire 
pictures she used as g j f t s , I ! 52 5 i ] 35 : 2 ] - J 3 8 : 2 ] T1 iese ai i.• :i 
other payments for Mr. Gerkin's artistic services, however, 
cannot 1: e categorized as a sharii Ig : f expenses, 
Ms. Sursa did buy one drawing from Mr. Gerkin knowing he 
wou 1 d use the funds to sati sf;y a 1 Iouse 1 i :: Id expense. "He drew 
[her] a picture and [she] paid his el ectric bill so [his 
power] wouldi i' 1 ) : e turned off . " R 525 : 131 : 1 7-21 . At hi s 
request, she wrote the check to the company rather than paT- n ng 
him directly. R. 525:131:24-132:1. In sum, though Ms. Sursa 
was acquainted with Mr . Gerkin for moj :e than tw< D ;  /ea rs R . 
525:112:18-21, only one utility bill was paid by her for him, 
and this was not a gi ft, k n it i r a t h e r :i i 1 e •: i change f : 1 : artwork 1 ,  E 
sketched. Mr, Gerkin and Ms. Sursa did not share living 
expenses. 
POINT IV 
MS. SURSA SHOULD BE AWARDED THE FEES AND COSTS SHE 
INCURS ON APPEAL. 
In Lyngle v. Lynqle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (1992) this 
Coui t :i i istr i i• ::te :i 11 Iat [g] ei iera 11 y, \ »'hen the trial court 
awards fees in a domestic action to the party who then 
substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to 
that party on appeal. " This statement of law is widely 
accepted in Utah as the general rule. See Hall v. Hall, 658 
P. 2d 1018, 1027 (Utah Ct A
 pp. ] qq • , ; nLlJ v. Hill, , • I . 2d 
963, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 2^2, 
27 5 (Utah ' ' I .,? ,pp . 1 993 ) I n s i i : 1 I :: a s e s , 11 I e C o i i r t " r ei na i id [ s ] 
for entry of reasonable fees," Lyngle, 831 P.2d at 1031. 
Ms , Si J rsa, 1 iax i i i• :j I: 3ei i awar ded a11orney' s f ees at the 
trial court, Addendum 4, should be awarded the fees and costs 
she i i i c u r s o i i t: 1 I i s a p p e a 1. 
// 
// 
2 8 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Sursa requests that the Court affirm, the trial 
court's dismj ssal , and awa rd 1 ler the cos ts and 1 egad fees she 
incurs on appeal. 
DATED this J-' _ day of December, ,004. 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
By: 
Clark B Allred 
By: CA^A 4 * ts-
Clark A. McClellan 
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ADDENDUM 
1. DECREE OF DIVORCE 
2. ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
3. TRIAL EXHIBIT 1 
4 . JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) 
6. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
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JOHN C. BEASLIN, P.C, #0258 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 North Vernal Avenue, Suite 1 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 7894201 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
KENNETH D. SURSA, 
) 
Plaintiff, 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Vs. 
) 
KAREN J. SURSA, Civil No. 004000114 DA 
) 
Defendant. Judge: John R. Anderson 
) 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing before the above-entitled court on the 16m day of 
July 2001 before the Honorable John R. Anderson. The Plaintiff was present in court and 
represented by his counsel, John C. Beaslin and Kenneth G. Anderton. The Defendant was 
present in court and was represented by her counsel, Clark A, McClellan. Three (3) months have 
elapsed from the date the Complaint of the Plaintiff was filed. The Plaintiff testified with 
reference to the jurisdictional grounds and the parties indicated to the court that they had reached 
a settlement in this matter and counsel for the Plaintiff dictated the stipulation of the parties. 
Based upon the stipulation and the court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in this matter it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
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1. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant that shall 
become permanent and final upon entry into the computer by the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
The following-described property is hereby awarded to the Defendant, Karen Sursa: 
A. 19.77 acres of real property located in Section 30, Township 1 South Range 1 
West, USM, together with the improvements thereon. Defendant, however, is awarded the 
property subject to her paying the remaining balance due and owing on the mortgage to Zions 
Bank in Roosevelt, Utah, and holding Plaintiff hannless there from. The approximate mortgage 
balance is the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($74,500.00). The Defendant is ordered to make all future payments on said property 
commencing August 10, 2001. The Defendant is ordered to be responsible for all taxes and 
insurance on said property for the year 2001 and all subsequent years. 
B. A Trust Deed Note and Contract balance with Doug Fillingharn and Sammi 
M. Fillingharn with an approximate balance of FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($40,000.00). 
Said note is dated November 1,1996. Plaintiff will assign his interest in said contract and note 
to the Defendant. 
C. A riding mower located on the real property described in paragraph 5A. above 
is hereby awarded to the Defendant. 
D. An account with Merrell Lynch in Salt Lake City, Utah, account #421-
BlMl6(401 k) in the approximate sum of FORTY-SDC THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
2 
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TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($46,525.00). Plaintiff will assign his interest in said account to the 
Defendant 
E. An account with Merrell Lynch in Salt Lake City, Utah, account #421-
82M32(SEP account) in the approximate sum of SDCTY-FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($65,200.00). Plaintiff will assign his interest in said account to the Defendant. 
F. Household items of furniture and furnishings located in the home set forth 
above are hereby awarded to the Defendant subject, however, to the Plaintiff receiving his 
personal property. 
G. The additional sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($148,000.00) cash. Plaintiff has paid to the Defendant the sum of SEVENTY-
FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($74,000.00), receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, on 
July 16, 2001. The remaining balance of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($74,000.00) will be payable commencing with a payment of at least FIVE THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($5,000.00) on August 16, 2001 with a like amount on the sixteenth (16th) day of 
each and every month thereafter until February 16,2002. Interest on said amount will be at eight 
percent (8%) per annum commencing from July 16,2001 until paid in full. The entire amount is 
to be paid in full on or before February 16,2002. If there remains any unpaid principal amount 
and interest as of February 16, 2002, then the Defendant will be entitled to a judgment in that 
amount forthwith without further notice to the Plaintiff. 
H. Each of the parties is hereby ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs 
of court incurred in this matter. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the appraisal fees to 
3 
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Dale Cameron. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay for any debts or obligations that were to 
be paid on her Order to Show Cause, which was not heard by the court, 
L The Plaintiff, commencing on August 1, 2001, and each month thereafter is 
ordered to pay to the Defendant the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($3,100.00) per month, A separate account will be established at the bank for an automatic 
deposit to Defendant's account each month. Alimony will continue until such time as it is either 
modified or terminated by the court or upon the remarriage or co-habitation of the Defendant. 
6. The Plaintiff, Kenneth Sursa, is hereby awarded the following property: 
A. All of the parties' interest in Kappen Enterprises, Inc., a Utah Corporation, 
dba Tiger Tanks. The Defendant will execute and surrender any stock certificates that might be 
in her name. Right, title and interest to the said stock are hereby awarded to the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant will have no interest in the business. 
B. A fifth-wheel trailer 
C. Two (2) horses 
D. A horse trailer 
E. Ail personal property belonging to the Plaintiff as set forth above that is in the 
home awarded to the Defendant is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff along with all items of 
household furniture and furnishings in the apartment in Roosevelt, Utah belonging to the 
Plaintiff. 
7. Both parties are hereby ordered to sign all documents, including assignments, to 
transfer assets to each other pursuant to the stipulation. 
4 
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8. The parties have agreed to a mutual restraining order and it is so ordered by the court. 
( A M (A. ^— 
Clark A. McClellan 
Attorney for Defendant 
5 
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FILED 
ttSTWCT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUHTY.UWH 
OCT 10 2003 
w Arf> DEPUTY 
CLARK B ALLRBD - 0055 w ' 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLREO, McCLELLAN t TROTTER/ P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (43S) 722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH D. SURSA, 
vs. 
KAREN J. SURSA, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 004000114 DA 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial 
on September 22, 2003. The Petitioner, Kenneth E. Sursa, was 
present with his attorney Bryan Sidwcll. The Respondent, Karon J, 
Sursa, was present with her attorney Clark B Allred. The 
Petitioner called several witnesses and then rested. The 
Respondent moved for a directed verdict and requested that the 
Petitioner's petition be dismissed. The Court having heard the 
evidence and argument from counsel and having reviewed the case law 
and other information provided granted the motion and based thereon 
makes and enters the following order-
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X. The Issue before the Court was whether the Court should 
terminate the Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony on the claim 
that the Respondent was cohabitating with Dane Gerken. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 830-3-5(10), the Petitioner 
who is seeking to terminate alimony, had the burden to establish 
that the Respondent, Karen J, Sursa, was cohabitating with Dane 
Gerken. 
3. The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Petitioner, shows that the Respondent and Mr, Gerken had a 
friendship and a dating relationship. There was no evidence to 
show an intent or desire by the Respondent to move in or live with 
Mr. Gerken. The evidence did not establish that the Respondent was 
cohabitating with Mr. Gerken. The facts did not meet either the 
residency or the sexual relationship requirements, required by the 
case law to establish cohabitation. 
4. The Petitioner dismissed his alternative claim to 
reduce alimony based on a change of financial circumstances prior 
to the trial. 
5. Because the Court granted a directed verdict evidence 
was not received on the issue of reimbursement of legal fees. The 
Respondent had submitted to the Court an affidavit regarding the 
attorney fees and costs she has incurred thru September IS, 2003. 
The Court Therefore Orders as follows: 
2 
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X. The Petitionary Petition to Modify is dismissed. 
2. The Respondent is to file with the court documentation 
and affidavit* regarding the income, expenses and ability to pay 
legal fees and costs and supplement the affidavit regarding the 
fees she incurred. If the Petitioner disagrees with the 
information provided or desires to submit additional information on 
the issue o£ whether the court should award fees and if so how much 
he may file that additional information and an objection within ten 
days of the date Respondent furnishes her information. If no 
objection is received, the Court, based on the information provided 
will determine that issue• If there is an objection the Court will 
then schedule a hearing on the attorney's fee issue. 
DATED t h i s /£!% of Pet' , 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
I 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Choree Brotherson, am employed by the office of McKEACHNIE, 
ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P. C. attorneys for Respondent herein 
and hereby certify that I served the attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
on Petitioner by placing a true end correct copy thereon in an 
envelope addressed to: 
BRYAN SEOWELL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
134 WEST MAIN, SUITE 202 
VERNAL, UTAH 84076 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the i?0 w 
day of September, 2003. 
C"^ : 
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNXE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P-C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435) 722-3928 
ay **V* 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH D. SURSA, ) 
Petitioner ) 
vs. 
KAREN J. SURSA 
Respondent 
JUDGMENT FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
i Civil NO. 004000114 
i Judge: John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial on 
September 22, 2003, At the conclusion of the Petitioner's case, 
the Court granted a motion for a directed verdict. The Respondent 
had requested reimbursement of her attorney's fees and had# prior 
to trial, filed with the Court an Affidavit regarding the 
attorney's fees incurred prior to trial. The Court, after 
dismissing the case, directed the Respondent to furnish additional 
information regarding the fees and costs incurred and her need for 
reimbursement of those fees as well as the Petitioner's ability to 
pay those fees. The Court ordered that the Petitioner would have 
ten (10) days to file an objection. 
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The Petitioner filed a supplemental affidavit regarding 
attorney's fees, a document entitled Exhibits Regarding 
Petitioner'. Ability to Pay Fees and Lack of Merit on Change of 
Circumstances Claim, which has attached to it the Petitioner's 
current tax returns and excerpts from depositions and Respondent's 
affidavit regarding her income and expenses. 
Those documents show that the Respondent has incurred 
substantial attorney's fees in defending this matter in the amount 
of $14,656.63. The Petitioner dismissed his claim of a change of 
circumstances prior to trial but after significant fees and costs 
were incurred and the Respondent was the prevailing party at the 
trial. The Respondent's sole source of income is the alimony 
payments that she receives. Due to her age, lack of work 
experience and health, she does not have the ability to earn 
income. Her monthly living expenses exceed the amount that she 
receives in alimony. She was required to incur legal fees and has 
need to be reimbursed for those fees. The Petitioner's tax returns 
show that he earns income ranging from $247,000 to $363r000 per 
year. He also receives significant benefits from the business 
including vehicles, fuel, retirement, insurance and entertainment. 
His income is significantly more than Respondent's and he certainly 
has the ability to reimburse her for the fees she has incurred. 
The Court Therefore Orders, Adjuges and Decrees that the 
Petitioner is to reimburse the Respondent for the attorney's fees 
2 
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and costs she has incurred in the amount of $14f656-63- Pursuant 
to Rule 4-911 of the Rules of Judicial Administration those fees 
are to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order-
DATED this [Lg day of OOtober, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
By: fl I 
John R. Anderson ~ 
District Court Judge 
3 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) 
Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an 
action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the 
presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not 
granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the 
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. 
The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and 
render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render 
any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court 
renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless 
the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an 
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, 
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in 
granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded 
in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in 
an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The 
trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of 
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on 
more than one ground. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Clark A. McClellan, office of ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P. C. 
attorneys for Respondent herein and hereby certify that I served 
the attached BRIEF OF APPELLEE on Petitioner by placing a true and 
correct copy thereon in an envelope addressed to: 
LORIE D. FOWLKE 
SCRIBNER & MCCANDLESS, P.C. 
2696 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVE., SUITE 220 
PROVO, UTAH 8 4 604 
and deposited the same, sealed, with next-day postage prepaid 
thereon, to United Parcel Service at Vernal, Utah, on the 20th day 
of December, 2004. 
Clark A. McClellan 
